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Abstract
Payment fraud has been a problem for merchants for a long time. More recently,
e-commerce has transformed the way that most retailers do business. However,
the possibility of reaching anyone in the world through the internet also makes it
easier for fraudsters to hide their identity. Payment fraud leads to billions of dollars
in losses for merchants. With the development of machine learning algorithms,
researchers have been finding increasingly sophisticated ways to detect fraud without
ever seeing a fraudster.
We propose a data mining approach to the problem of detecting fraud in e-
tail businesses. Our approach is based on extracting the most information from
the data available to the merchants, such as customer history, payment details,
order data and customer behaviour. An exploratory analysis is done on the data
from the online marketplace for luxury fashion Farfetch. Several feature engineering
functions are used. Three different machine learning algorithms are applied for the
classification problem: Random Forests, Logistic Regression and Support Vector
Machines. A deployment solution for classification of incoming orders is proposed
and implemented at the case study company.
This dissertation details the many steps needed to develop a fraud detection
solution by data mining. We conclude that machine learning algorithms are essential
in supporting human workers in classifying orders efficiently. The results show that
the features which are used are very important for the performance of the classifier
and that Random Forests is a very effective and versatile model to use.
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Resumo
A fraude de pagamento e´ ha´ muito tempo um problema para os comerciantes.
O come´rcio electro´nico transformou a forma de como retalhistas fazem nego´cio,
trazendo a possibilidade de chegar a clientes de todo o mundo atrave´s da inter-
net. No entanto, esses desenvolvimentos tornaram tambe´m mais fa´cil a ocultac¸a˜o
da indentidade de indiv´ıduos que cometem atividades fraudulentas. A fraude de
pagamento e´ responsa´vel por perdas de muitos milhares de milho˜es de do´lares para
os comerciantes. Com o desenvolvimento de algoritmos de machine learning, teˆm
sido estudados me´todos cada vez mais sofisticados de detetar fraude.
Propomos uma abordagem de data mining para o problema de detec¸a˜o de fraude
no contexto de retalho online. A nossa abordagem e´ baseada em extrair a ma´xima
informac¸a˜o a partir dos dados que esta˜o dispon´ıveis ao comerciante, tais como o
histo´rico de cliente, detalhes de pagamento, detalhes da encomenda e comporta-
mento do cliente. E´ feita uma ana´lise explorato´ria com os dados disponibilizados
pela plataforma online de venda de artigos de luxo Farfetch. Sa˜o criadas va´rias
varia´veis novas atrave´s de engenharia de varia´veis. Sa˜o aplicados treˆs algoritmos
para o problema de classificac¸a˜o: Random Forests, Logistic Regression e Support
Vector Machines. E´ feita uma implementac¸a˜o da soluc¸a˜o proposta para classificac¸a˜o
de encomendas na empresa de estudo de caso.
Esta dissertac¸a˜o inclui detalhes sobre os va´rios passos necessa´rios para o desen-
volvimento de uma soluc¸a˜o de data mining para detec¸a˜o de fraude. Conclu´ımos
que os algoritmos de machine learning sa˜o essenciais como sistema de apoio a` de-
cisa˜o humana para classificac¸a˜o eficiente de encomendas. Os resultados mostram
que a decisa˜o de quais varia´veis utilizar e´ muito importante para o desempenho dos
modelos e que Random Forests e´ o modelo mais versa´til e com a maior efica´cia.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
“Fraud is nothing new to the merchant. Since the beginning of time, man has
always looked for the opportunity to defraud others - to gain goods or services
without making payment.” Montague [2010]
Despite not being new, fraud is a major problem for merchants, particularly in
the online sector. According to the 14th annual report of CyberSource [CyberSource,
2013] the total revenue loss for e-commerce merchants in North America amounted
to $3.5bi in 2012, which represents 0.9% of the total revenue. The report also states
that the fraud rate for orders outside of North America was almost twice as high,
averaging 1.6%.
Bhatla et al. [2003] define credit card fraud as the action of an individual who
uses a credit card for personal reasons without the consent of the owner of the credit
card and with no intention of repaying the purchase made. Contrary to what many
consumers believe, merchants are responsible for paying the bill when a fraudster
steals goods or services in a consumer-not-present(CNP) transaction. These include
all transactions where the physical card is not given to the merchant, such as in
mail and telephone orders and in e-commerce. On the other hand, card associations
protect the merchants in the case of consumer-present (CP) transactions [Montague,
2010]. In case of e-commerce fraud, when an individual has made an unauthorized
purchase with a credit card, the merchant who accepted the transaction will loose
the product sold (if it has been shipped), may face chargeback fees and loss of
reputation [Bhatla et al., 2003].
In order to avoid losses related to fraud, merchants must implement strategies
for fraud prevention and fraud detection. Fraud detection is often mistaken for
fraud prevention. Bolton et al. [2002] make this distinction clear, “Fraud prevention
describes measures to stop fraud from occurring in the first place (...) In contrast,
fraud detection involves identifying fraud as quickly as possible once it has been
perpetrated.”
Measures for fraud prevention are the key to solving problems of fraud. A very
effective measure of fraud prevention in credit cards is the chip-and-pin technology.
Despite the prevalence of this technology in Europe, it is still not mainstream in most
other regions, including North-America. However, even when fraud prevention is
highly effective, fraud detection is still required, since even the most advanced system
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is prune to fail. Moreover, as fraud detection techniques become more sophisticated,
so do fraudsters. Quah and Sriganesh [2008] claim that the key for accurate fraud
detection lies in developing dynamic systems that can adapt to new fraud patterns
in the e-marketplace. Fraud prevention and detection must therefore evolve hand in
hand, faster than fraudsters.
Fraud detection has been explored in several industries with different ap-
proaches. When large volumes of data are involved, manual detection becomes
impractical. In these cases, the so-called “data mining” techniques, based on statis-
tical methods and artificial intelligence, are imperative. Some studied applications
of statistical fraud detection methods include:
• Credit applications
• Telecommunications
• Credit card transactions
The first type of fraud consists in presenting false documentation with the
purpose of obtaining credit from a financial institution. The other two applications,
telecommunications and credit card transaction fraud were according to Phua et al.
[2010] the two most published applications of data mining for fraud detection by
2010. Telecommunications fraud mainly occurs in two forms, subscription fraud (e.g.
obtaining a subscription with no intention of paying) or surfing fraud (e.g. mobile
phone cloning) [Bolton et al., 2002]. We are concerned about the latter application,
credit card fraud detection. Despite the fact that most literature focuses on the bank
perspective, this study aims at exploring fraud detection in online payments from
the perspective of an e-commerce merchant. Credit card fraud is indeed a big part
of the fraud perpetrated in online payments, as explained in the following section.
1.1.1 E-commerce: how online payments work
There are many possibilities for online merchants to accept payments. Montague
[2010] mentions examples such as credit card, direct debit, cash alternative payments
(such as PayPal, Alipay) or mobile payments. Cash alternative and mobile payments
are becoming more popular and are a must for merchants who want to sell in specific
overseas regions. However credit card transactions still dominate the market of e-
commerce business [Montague, 2010]. Thus, it is fundamental to understand how
credit card payments work.
Figure 1.1 describes the steps involved in an online credit card transaction.
The merchant first verifies that the card number provided by the customer could
be a legitimate card number (Card Authentication). After this step, the merchant
will seek feedback from the bank who issued the credit card to be sure that there
are funds available in the card account (Card Authorization). Finally, the merchant
requests the Settlement of the transaction, the physical transfer of the funds to the
merchant’s bank. These steps of the transaction, which can be seen left on Figure
1.1, lead to the conclusion of the sale.
Further steps occur only in case a consumer requests a chargeback by claiming
that he did not get the products or services requested or that the order was placed
by a fraudster. In this case, the merchant can dispute the chargeback by providing
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Figure 1.1: Diagram of online payments steps. Source: Montague [2010]
documentation about the order (Representment). If the merchant cannot reverse
the chargeback, he will have to return the money to the customer’s account and the
sale is lost. Moreover, merchants can be subject to chargeback fees and fines from
card associations if the chargeback rate is above their thresholds [Montague, 2010].
1.1.2 The fraud detection problem
Fraud detection is a data mining problem of increased difficulty, because fraudsters
make their best efforts to make their behaviour appear legitimate. This undifferen-
tiated behaviour creates a higher challenge in separating good and bad transactions.
Another difficulty with fraud detection is that the number of legitimate records is
far greater than the number of fraudulent cases [Bolton et al., 2002]. Such imbal-
anced data sets require additional precautions from the data analyst. In most cases,
fraud detection applications can make use of large records of data. Bolton et al.
[2002] mention the example of a credit card company carrying 350m transactions
each year. However, such data is very rarely available for study.
The aim of a fraud management solution is to minimize the financial losses
due to fraud and the overhead costs of preventing such losses [Bhatla et al., 2003].
An efficient solution must balance the trade-off between the cost of reviewing a
transaction and the potential savings due to fraud detection [Bhatla et al., 2003].
1.2 Objectives and methodology
The goal of this study is to develop a risk scoring solution for e-tail merchants based
on data mining techniques. As it was noted previously, fraud detection problems
involve a trade-off between several objectives. On one hand, the solution must be
able to quickly evaluate a large number of transactions. Additionally, it must meet
two key metrics: maximize the number of fraudulent transactions detected (i.e.
number of chargebacks avoided) and minimize the number of customer insults (i.e.
number of legitimate transactions refused).
A proof of concept was built around the case study of the e-tail merchant
Farfetch. This case study provided a real setting, which is certainly representa-
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Figure 1.2: CRISP-DM reference model phases. Source: Chapman et al. [2000]
tive of many business situations. The work was developed with access to factual
data and the chance to compare the results with current practice. We followed
the methodology suggested in the Cross Industry Standard Process for Data Mining
(CRISP-DM), Chapman et al. [2000]. This methodology was published in the year
2000 as a guide for data mining practitioners. It draws a process model for data
mining projects organized into phases, generic tasks, specialized tasks and process
instances. In this study we went through all main phases of the data mining project
as described in Figure 1.2.
At first, we tried to gain understanding of the key business concepts and
objectives involved. Thereafter, we tried to collect and understand the data. From
there, the data was prepared and modelled with machine learning algorithms. Lastly,
we have evaluated the results and deployed the solution at the company of the case
study.
The remainder of the dissertation is organised in five more chapters. Chapter 2
comprises a review of the state of the art in fraud detection. Chapter 3 describes the
case study of Farfetch. Chapter 4 reports the steps taken in finding the right data
and the outcomes of the exploratory analysis performed on it. Chapter 5 describes
the use of the machine learning methods for modelling and the results obtained, as
well as the deployment process. Chapter 6 presents conclusions of the work done
and gives suggestions for future work in this area.
Chapter 2
State of the Art
2.1 Different approaches to fraud detection in card-not-
present transactions
Fraud detection has been the objective of research for a long time. With the increase
in online payments, an increase in fraud has followed and merchants and banks must
innovate to keep ahead of ever more sophisticated fraud perpetrators. Different
approaches have been developed to face the threat of e-commerce fraud. Montague
[2010] suggests the following techniques:
• Identity proofing
• Guaranteed payments
• Expert-rules
• Data sharing
• Technology
• Data mining
Montague [2010] defines each of the techniques in the following way. Identity
proofing techniques have the aim of verifying that the customer really is who he
says he is. These techniques can include e-mail, phone or address authentication
through public data to get proof of the buyer’s identity or calling the customer to
assure that he is the owner of the phone. Guaranteed payments include merchandise
insurance or authentication services provided by card associations, which guarantee
that the merchant is not responsible for chargebacks. Guaranteed payments are
very effective, but implemented in exchange of a fee. Expert-rules comprise all the
techniques which are based on rules created from the experience of fraud analysts,
including the use of positive and negative lists of users or the manual revision of
orders. Such rules can be very effective, but it is hard to maintain them up to date.
Data sharing allows merchants to have more information about the customer,
by acquiring such information from an external provider. This data can include
credit records, social network activity or address confirmation. Data sharing can
be very useful when used in combination with scoring models. Technology services
can be used to enhance the available information on the user. A merchant can use
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biometrics systems to confirm identity or detect the use of proxy servers to hide the
IP address of the device used in the purchase. Although technological advancements
help stopping fraud, fraudsters also innovate and make use of them to hide their
identity.
Data mining techniques take into account past transactions to estimate the
probability of a new transaction being fraudulent, by the use of advanced statistical
methods. The output of data mining techniques can be a suspicion score or a
direct advise to accept or reject the order. Due to the technical complexity of these
techniques, a high experience is needed in order to implement them and they require
an organised history of orders to learn from. We will now go into more detail on
data mining techniques.
2.2 Data mining techniques for fraud detection
According to Phua et al. [2010], “it is impossible to be absolutely certain about the
legitimacy of and intention behind an application or transaction. Given the reality,
the best cost effective option is to tease out possible evidences of fraud from the
available data using mathematical algorithms.” Data mining techniques for fraud
detection are divided in two main approaches:
• Supervised methods
• Unsupervised methods
Both of these approaches are based on training an algorithm with a record of
observations from the past. Supervised methods require that each of those observa-
tions used for learning has a label about which class it belongs to. In the context of
fraud detection, this means that for each observation we know if it belongs to the
class “fraudulent” or to the class “legitimate”. Supervised methods could also be
used to learn multi-class problems (more than two classes), but this is usually not
the case in fraud detection.
As noted before (cf. Introduction), fraud detection classification problems suf-
fer from the issue of imbalanced class sizes, i.e. the number of fraudulent records
is much smaller than that of legitimate transactions. Moreover, existing fraud de-
tection measures usually reduce the number of frauds available for study to an even
lower number. Most supervised methods perform best when trained on a balanced
data set.
It is common to face data mining problems when we do not know to which class
an observation belongs. For example, take the case of an online order which payment
was rejected. One will never know whether this was a legitimate order or whether
it had been correctly rejected. Such occurrences favour the use of unsupervised
methods, which do not require data to be labelled. These methods look for extreme
data occurrences or outliers. In order to get the best of two worlds, some solutions
combine supervised and unsupervised techniques.
2.2.1 Review of unsupervised methods for fraud detection
Unsupervised methods are often used for exploratory analysis of data and prepro-
cessing. When trying to reduce the dimensionality of samples, it is very useful to
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use unsupervised methods such as clustering or principal component analysis to find
interesting directions to explore. In fraud detection, unsupervised methods imple-
mentations focus on finding outlier transactions, which do not agree with normal
patterns. However, such methods are not adequate for complete fraud detection so-
lutions. Indeed, almost all authors studied preferred the use of supervised learning.
Moreau et al. [1999] compared the use of supervised and unsupervised neural
networks. Their experiment had results where the unsupervised method performed
far below the supervised neural network. Cortes et al. [2001] explored the use of
Graph analysis for fraud detection in a telecommunications setting. Given its nature,
telecommunications fraud is a logical candidate area to use graph analysis. Quah
and Sriganesh [2008] proposed a mixed approach with the use of a self-organising
map which feeds a Neural Network if a transaction does not fall into an identified
normal behaviour for the given customer.
2.2.2 Review of supervised methods for fraud detection
Most of the published work on statistical methods for fraud detection falls under
the category of supervised methods.
Ghosh and Reilly [1994] proposed the use of a neural network for fraud de-
tection at a commercial bank, which proved more accurate than the previously
implemented rule based expert system. Fawcett and Provost [1997] studied the use
of a profiling approach to telecommunications fraud. The creation of profiles of user
behaviour is favoured if there is a high usage of the service, such as in the case of
telecommunications. Merchants usually do not have access to payment data other
than the transactions made at this specific merchant, which makes it hard to trace
a consumer spending profile. Chan and Stolfo [1998] discussed the combination of
multiple classifiers in an attempt to create scalable systems which would be able to
deal with large volumes of data. In general, the emphasis of research in the late
90s and early 2000s was on Artificial Neural Networks. Bolton et al. [2002] noted in
2002 that the published literature about fraud detection was scarce.
More recently, some other works have been published, making use of newer
classification techniques. Srivastava et al. [2008] built a model based on a Hid-
den Markov Model, with focus on fraud detection for credit card issuing banks.
Whitrow et al. [2009] also worked on credit-card fraud detection with data from a
bank, in particular addressing the way of pre-processing the data. They studied
the use of aggregation of transactions when using Random Forests, Support Vector
Machines, Logistic Regression and K-Nearest Neighbour techniques. Bhattacharyya
et al. [2011] compared the performance of Random Forests, Support Vector Ma-
chines and Logistic Regression for detecting fraud of credit-card transactions in an
international financial institution. Random Forest proved to be the most effective
and most versatile method in this case.
2.2.3 Final perspective on data mining techniques for fraud detec-
tion
Phua et al. [2010] pinpoint two criticisms to the data mining studies of fraud detec-
tion: the lack of publicly available data and the lack of published literature on the
8 Chapter 2. State of the Art
topic. Moreover, despite the fact that there are many research papers about statisti-
cal methods for fraud detection, Phua et al. [2010] point out that only seven studies
claimed to have been implemented in practice by 2010. Most literature on credit
card fraud detection has focused on classification models with data from banks.
Such data invariably consists of transaction registries, where it is possible to find
fraud evidence such as “collision” or “high velocity” events, i.e. transactions hap-
pening at the same time in different locations. Some authors have also addressed the
techniques for finding the best derived features. Whitrow et al. [2009] proved that
transaction aggregation improved performance in some situations, with the aggre-
gation period being an important parameter. However, none of these particularities
seems to apply to a case of detecting fraud with data from one single merchant as
in our case.
In this study, we chose to use methods of supervised learning for the classifica-
tion problem, because it is common for fraud detection applications to have labelled
data for training. We chose to test three different models. Logistic regression be-
cause of its popularity, and Random Forests and Support Vector Machines, which
have been used in a variety of applications showing superior performance [Bhat-
tacharyya et al., 2011]. Meyer et al. [2003] showed that Support Vector Machines
perform well in classification problems. Bhattacharyya et al. [2011] claim that Ran-
dom Forests are very attractive for fraud detection due to the ease of application
and being computationally efficient.
Chapter 3
Farfetch Case Study
3.1 Fraud at Farfetch
Farfetch is one of the leading online luxury fashion retailers in 2015. The company
follows a marketplace business model, selling items from more than 300 partner bou-
tiques on a commission basis. The partner boutiques place their items online on the
Farfetch.com portal, which allows small-medium boutiques to reach a global audi-
ence with economies of scale. Farfetch provides an omni-channel buying experience
through the website, mobile or via telephone order. The value proposition for bou-
tiques includes payment processing, branding, online content creation, out-bound
logistics and customer service.
Farfetch was founded in 2008 and had substantial growth since then. Its focus
is on retailing luxury items, which results in an average order value of around $650.
The gross merchandise revenue in 2014 amounted to $300m and the company expects
to grow by 70% in 2015, reaching $500m in sales.
As part of payment processing, fraud detection is included as an added value
service provided by Farfetch. Moreover, being acknowledged by customers and card
associations as a trustworthy merchant is even more important when doing business
online. Farfetch wants to provide its customers high payment acceptance rates
in order to convert as many sales as possible, while keeping the number of fraud
occurrences to a minimum level. The company’s prospects for the mid-term future
foresee a sustained growth rate around 50-70%/year. This means that it must find
a way to quickly evaluate a large number of orders in order to maintain the efficient
service to its growing customer base.
Besides handling its own website, one of the pillars of the strategy of Farfetch
is the provision of its platform as a service for brands to manage their e-commerce
operations for them. This project, named “Black & White” is planned to launch
in 2016. In this case, payment processing and fraud detection are again part of the
value proposition of Farfetch.
Farfetch provides a good case study for a data mining solution for fraud detec-
tion, because it is representative of an online retailer and there is a large record of
orders to study from. Furthermore, the company’s interest in exploring this solution
in-house is high, since fraud detection is aligned with the company’s strategy.
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Figure 3.1: Current process for fraud detection at Farfetch
Each case has its own particular characteristics, different areas and merchants
are affected by fraud differently. At Farfetch, the history of orders to study from is
skewed towards more recent dates due to its high growth rate. This means that there
are not so many old orders to learn fraud patterns from, as more recent orders. The
evolution of Farfetch’s business also presents another challenge: it became a more
popular target for fraud as it became more famous.
Furthermore, Farfetch ships to anywhere in the world. Such service is of high
value to attract customers, but also comes with challenges in terms of fraud pre-
vention and detection. Shipping goods to countries where it is almost impossible to
verify addresses is a big risk. The diversity of locations also adds to the complexity
of detecting geographical patterns of fraud.
3.2 Current practice of fraud detection at Farfetch (As-
Is)
Fraud detection at Farfetch is called order approval, as the final decision to take is
whether to approve or reject the order. This is done in 2 main steps:
1. An automatic screening based on lists of trusted users
2. A manual review process for the rest of the orders
Figure 3.1 illustrates the different steps in the order approval process. At first,
the user which made the order is compared against a positive list of trusted users
and a negative list of fraudulent users. In case the user is found on one of the lists,
the order is immediately approved or refused, respectively. The generation of the
lists is based on expert-rules and described in Section 3.2.1. This first screening
step processes circa 35% of all orders. Very few orders are refused at this step, as
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fraudsters quickly learn that the user account they used before has been blocked.
Most processed orders are approvals of orders by long-time clients.
The second step of the approval process requires direct human intervention
and is handled by the Order Support Team. This team handles all global orders
and is divided between the Farfetch office in Porto, Portugal and Los Angeles, USA,
providing service 24/7.
The details of the orders are checked by the team for any indications of fraud.
The kind of indications that they are looking for is described in Section 3.3. If
this team suspects that the order is fraudulent, they will either cancel it or call the
customer to get more details.
In the case that doubts remain after calling the customer (no confidence that
the order is legitimate nor fraudulent), the fraud analyst can decide to subject the
order to an evaluation by a third-party evaluation provider. This external provider
acts as an insurance: it can approve the order collecting a share of the sale and it
will cover the cost in case of a chargeback. Recurring to this provider is expensive
and only a residual number of orders go through that evaluation.
The Farfetch office in Brazil has its own order approval process and is not in
the scope of our research. All other orders, except those being shipped to Brazil,
are included in this study.
3.2.1 List-based evaluation
The positive list which contains the trusted users, whose orders are automatically
approved, is updated on a regular basis. The criteria for considering a user trust-
worthy is based on her/his history of orders. If its values surpass the established
thresholds, this user in put on the positive list. Likewise, any user whose order was
flagged as fraudulent will be put on the negative list, whose orders get automatically
rejected. It is important to note that not all rejected orders are flagged as fraudu-
lent, only those for which the Order Support Team is certain of fraudulent activity
or the orders which originated a chargeback.
3.2.2 Key performance indicators
Farfetch tracks several key performance indicators (KPIs) related to fraud detection
in daily, weekly and monthly reports. The main KPIs consist of: the automation
level - percentage of orders automatically processed; chargeback level - percentage
of orders which originate a chargeback (calculated by order value); rate of refused
payments - percentage of payments which are refused (calculated by order value);
speed of processing - time it takes to approve or reject an order payment; level of
proof of billing - percentage of orders which require a call to the customer.
3.3 Resources
The fraud analysts at Farfetch review most orders manually and thus have an ex-
tensive experience about fraud detection. According to their practical observations,
the important signs to look for when evaluating an order are:
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• Accordance of shipping and billing addresses with the country of the credit
card being used (e.g. a credit card from the UK being used in an order to be
shipped to Australia would be noticed as a riskier transaction);
• Past fraud occurrences with the same shipping address (e.g. certain cities were
considered of higher risk);
• Number of previous orders from the same customer (long time customers were
almost always considered legitimate);
• Type and brand of products (specific brands were preferred targets of fraud);
• Number of cards used by customer (a high number of cards tested would be
considered highly suspicious);
• Sudden increases in order values (e.g. it was thought that fraudsters would
generally attempt to purchase lower value items first and only later place orders
on their real targets: high value products);
• Orders placed by other users with the same name or to the same address
(might be an indication of multiple accounts used by the same individual);
• Publicly available information on the internet about the customer (trying to
understand whether the customer is a real person and not a fake alias).
We were given access to all the data related to transactions, orders and prod-
ucts in the database of Farfetch. However, this data was not organised for fraud
detection and must be mined for relevant information.
3.4 Proposed approach for Farfetch (To-Be)
The objective of Farfetch is to develop a process which will result in a higher number
of orders approved automatically, while not increasing the chargeback rate (i.e. the
number of fraudulent orders approved).
The company wants fraud detection to continue being a part of its value
proposition, even with the expected increase in the number of orders to process.
The current fraud detection process is not sustainable, because it would require
Farfetch to keep growing its Order Processing Team, which brings two challenges:
increasing costs and increasing difficulty to coordinate the team.
Hence, the proposed solution should achieve a higher automation rate than
the current process, keep the chargeback level stable and not increase the rate of
refused payments. In the medium-term the proposed solution should allow Farfetch
to reach a level of automation of 80% by the end of 2016, with a chargeback rate
under 1% and a payment refused rate under 4.5%. The data mining goals listed
in Table 3.1 state in technical terms the desired outcomes to achieve these business
goals [Chapman et al., 2000].
The proposed approach consists in building a risk scoring system based on ma-
chine learning methods which will estimate a Fraud Suspicion Score for each order.
This system would replace the current list-based order processing step. As opposed
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Table 3.1: Data mining goals
Goal Indicator
Increase number of orders
automatically processed
Number of orders with a suspicion score which falls
in the extremes of the range (i.e. close to 0 or close
to 1).
Low chargeback rate Number of false negatives (i.e. Fraudulent orders
with a low suspicion score)
Low rate of refused pay-
ments
Number of false positives (i.e. Legitimate orders
with a high suspicion score)
Figure 3.2: Proposed process for fraud detection at Farfetch
to comparing each order with a list of trustworthy users built by expert-rules, the
risk scoring should take many more characteristics of the order into consideration
(e.g. shipping destination, products being purchased, time of the order, etc.). A
diagram of the proposed process can be seen on Figure 3.2.
The suspicion score estimated by the model should be a number between 0
and 1. The risk scoring model would also evaluate whether the score falls below a
certain threshold (e.g. lower than 30%), where the order would be automatically
approved; or higher than an upper threshold (e.g. higher than 70%), where the
order would be automatically rejected. Orders with a score between the lower and
the upper thresholds would be manually evaluated by the order processing team,
which could also count on the suspicion score for a better evaluation. It is expected
that the number of orders whose score fall in the extreme areas is higher than 35%
of all orders, in order to reach a higher automation rate than with the currently used
list-based evaluation.
As a first step, we tried to gain a complete business understanding of the
problem. We had interviews with the involved parties at the company and shadowed
their fraud analysts at work. Finally we agreed on the objectives of the study and
the expected outcomes for the company.
14 Chapter 3. Farfetch Case Study
The second step involved building the data set of orders history. After a short
exploratory analysis we went to write a query to extract the data from the databases.
A thorough exploratory statistical analysis followed, where we identified possible
patterns of fraud by looking at individual variable distributions. The outcome was
a report which could be presented to the case study company to guide them in their
own analysis.
Next, the work on data modelling and data preparation evolved in parallel.
The variables which could not be included in the deployed model were left out; the
rest was prepared for modelling. During the modelling of the data we sequentially
performed training of three distinct machine learning algorithms: Logistic Regres-
sion, Random Forests and Support Vector Machines. This included performing
validation to find good model parameters and testing the solutions. The last step
was the deployment at Farfetch.
Chapter 4
Data understanding and
preparation
4.1 Building the dataset for study
Building the dataset on which to base the study is not a trivial activity and requires
decisions which can greatly affect the quality of the data mining project. Which
data to use? Where is this data to be found? Is all available data correct? The
following sections describe the reasoning behind the building of the data set which
was the basis of this study.
The handling of the data was done with the use of the programming lan-
guage Python [Rossum, 1995], version 2.7 available through the Python Software
Foundation at http://www.python.org. Two particular modules for Python, Pan-
das data structures [McKinney, 2010] and Scikit-Learn [Pedregosa et al., 2011], were
especially useful for the modelling of the algorithms.
4.1.1 Collection of the data
Taking in consideration the input from the Order Processing Team described in
Section 3.3 and the examples in the literature, we decided that the main unit to
analyse would be each individual order. With that in mind, the objective at this
stage was to build a table where each row would correspond to one order and each
column would represent different attributes of such order.
The bulk of data was queried from a table where each line describes one
product item in an order. Hence, a function of aggregation was applied so that each
observation would correspond to one order. At this point, several issues arose: each
order could have multiple products and for each line to represent an order, one must
aggregate the characteristics of the products purchased. Thus, a column was created
for each product gender (“Men”, “Women” or “Other”) and a count of the number
of products corresponding to each gender in the order was made. The same was
done for the product family (“Clothing”, “Shoes”, etc.). Aggregating the brand of
the product could not be done in the same way, because there were more than 2.500
possible brands – it would imply adding 2.500 columns to the table. To overcome
this problem, we chose to create individual columns for the 20 best-selling brands
only. Other products attributes such as item price or quantity were simply summed.
The aggregation steps were:
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1. Read all order-product lines
2. Group by order
(a) Sum item price, quantity
(b) Create one column for each gender, category and sum occurrences
(c) Aggregate product brand
i. Find the 20 top brands
ii. Create one column for each of the top 20 brands, count the rest under
the column BrandOther
3. Read and append data on the transaction (payment provider feedback)
4. Read and append data on user session (e.g. number of pageviews)
Building the data set and aggregating data involves a trade-off. A higher
level of aggregation results in a larger (more significant) number of occurrences
per category. On the other hand, the loss of information can be substantial if the
aggregation level is too high. Therefore, a balance had to be found. The final list
of variables in the data set can be read in Table 4.1.
4.1.2 How to label the orders as fraudulent?
One of the challenges in classification is the definition of the class for each data
entry. In our case, we faced a binary classification problem. Accordingly, each data
entry – an order – should be labelled as belonging to one of two classes: fraudulent
or non-fraudulent.
While it is possible to know which orders originated a chargeback transaction,
this does not comprise the whole set of fraudulent orders, because fraudulent orders
which were rejected did not lead to a transaction and naturally no chargeback.
Hence, a broader definition of the class fraudulent had to be found. The available
information on each order included:
• Approved or rejected by Order Processing Team
• If rejected, expressly marked as fraudulent by Order Processing Team
• If approved, led (or not led) to a chargeback
Therefore, two criteria are taken into consideration when defining the classes
of the dataset and we created a variable which is called LabelFraud with a value of
0 or 1, such that:
1. Order originated a chargeback or was marked as fraudulent (see Fig 4.1) →
Label as fraudulent (LabelFraud=1)
2. All other orders → Label as legitimate transactions (LabelFraud=0)
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Table 4.1: Summary of Input Variables
Name Type Description
LabelFraud Numeric Class Label
OrderTimeCustomer Numeric Local time at which the order was placed
OrderTimeGMT Numeric Absolute time at GMT
OrderValue Numeric Value of Order
Quantity Numeric Quantity of items in the order
CustomerCurrency Categorical Currency used by customer
ShippingType Categorical
TimeSinceFirstOrder Numeric Time elapsed since user’s first order at
Farfetch
NumCardsUsed Numeric Number of cards used by customer at
Farfetch
PaymentType Categorical
CardType Categorical Only for credit card
Fallback Numeric Only for credit card
Session3DUsed Numeric Only for credit card
TokenCreated Numeric if card data was saved by customer for
card re-use
TokenUsed Numeric if card saved data was re-used
CardName Categorical name on credit card, only for credit card
CardCountry Categorical only for credit card
AVSCode Categorical Address Verification System
CV2Code Categorical CV2 verification system
FraudScore Numeric score by payment processor
FamClothing Numeric number products family ’clothing’
... ... (other product families)
GenderWomen Numeric number products gender ’Women’
... ... (other gender categories: Men, Other)
BrandDolceGabbana Numeric number of products of the brand D&G
... ... (other brand categories: top 18 brands)
bAddress Categorical address indicated by user for billing
bZip Categorical
bCity Categorical
bCountry Categorical
bRegion Categorical
sAddress Categorical address indicated by user for shipping
sZip Categorical
sCity Categorical
sCountry Categorical
sRegion Categorical
PaymentAttempts Numeric Payment attemps by user
IP country Categorical
Sessions Numeric number sessions same day by user
Time spent on
portal
Numeric
Page views Numeric
ClickedPhotos Numeric
Browser Categorical
Device type Categorical
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Order
Rejected
Marked
explicitly
as fraud?
Approved
Chargeback
Occurred?
Figure 4.1: Criteria for labelling an order as fraudulent.
Figure 4.2: Cumulative distribution of the number of weeks before a chargeback is communicated
(Farfetch data)
4.1.3 Time to Chargeback – how to choose the data set
It takes a long time for the merchant to realise that a fraudulent transaction has
occurred. Most commonly, the alarm is first raised by the legitimate owner of
the credit card, who notices a transaction in his bank statement that he did not
make. Next, he must place a complaint on that transaction, which will originate a
chargeback. It seems natural, that with such lengthy procedures, it takes several
weeks between the time that the fraudsters uses the credit card and the merchant
is noticed of the chargeback.
This restricts the orders we can use for data mining, because the most recent
frauds won’t have been detected yet, i.e. the client did not submit a chargeback or
it was not yet communicated to the merchant. Hence, the first question to ask is:
which data can we study? How long does it take to know if an order was legitimate
or fraudulent?
The answer to these questions lies in knowing how long it will take between
the time that the order is placed and the chargeback is registered in the system of
the merchant. We found the answer by studying the chargeback history at Farfetch.
We can see from Figure 4.2 that 80% of the chargebacks arrive within the first 11
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weeks after the transaction.
Knowing this, it was decided that the data to be analysed should be no more
recent than 16 weeks (circa 4 months). Thus, the data set was trimmed to only
include orders older than July 2015. At the deployment stage, this criterion was also
included in order not to take the most recent data in consideration when training
the algorithm in the future.
4.1.4 Training and Testing set
The data set is split in two: a training and a testing set. Part of the data (the
training set) is then used for the algorithm to learn how to classify orders. The
remaining data (the testing set) is kept isolated, to be used just at the end of the
modelling procedure to estimate the performance of the chosen model, removing
the overfitting effect, i.e. the increase in performance that the algorithm has on
the instances it has based its learning on, when evaluating new orders, due to the
random error present in those particular instances.
According to the literature, the division between the number of observations
in the testing set should lay between 20-40% of the total number of data entries.
We chose to use 20% of them for testing, hence 80% of the data set was used for
training.
Besides deciding the amount of entries which belong in each set, we must
also decide which entries they are. The purpose of a testing set is to replicate as
close as possible the performance of the model when evaluating new data. It stands
to reason that randomly selected observations would emulate new data closer than
observations filtered by any variable. However, we chose to take into account the
date when the order was placed and consider the most recent 20% of orders for
testing. The reasoning behind this was that patterns of fraud change over time and
more recent orders would better emulate new orders.
The result of the division is a training set containing the orders placed be-
tween 2015-01-01 and 2015-06-21, totalling 347.572 observations; and a testing set
containing the orders placed between 2015-06-22 and 2015-08-04, in a total of 86.893
orders.
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Table 4.2: Key statistics of non-binary numeric variables
Name Count Mean Std Skewness Kurtosis
Quantity 347572 1.84 1.65 7.28 159.82
OrderValue 347572 502.25 682.91 9.62 336.67
TimeCustomer 347572 13.87 6.45 -0.58 -0.51
TimeGMT 347572 12.34 6.63 -0.21 -1.07
TimeSinceFirstOrder (Weeks) 347572 39.48 58.34 1.84 3.23
NumCardsUsed 347572 1.65 2.31 10.19 220.43
FraudScore 347572 1.59 22.77 -9.38 156.89
PaymentAttempts 347572 1.46 1.95 18.03 843.38
Sessions 338579 3.33 3.13 3.17 25.68
TimeSpent 338579 53.71 64.28 3.92 30.31
TotalPageViews 338579 45.79 49.31 3.9 28.8
4.2 Exploratory analysis on the training data
The analysis in this chapter is done with data from the training set only. Before
analysing the data, it is important to get an idea about the distributions of the nu-
meric variables. Table 4.2 shows some statistics of the non-binary numeric variables.
The first thing to note is that the variables related to the browser session of the
user (sessions, TimeSpent and TotalPageViews) only count 338.579 observations.
This means that there are 8.993 orders for which the data on these variables is
missing.
Looking at the table we can also note the high values of standard deviation
(at the same level as the mean). This suggests that there are very distinct patterns
of behaviour. The high kurtosis values indicate a peak around the mean value and
a long tail of extreme values. We can also learn from the table that some variables’
distributions are highly skewed, which is a sign that those distributions are not
symmetric.
Considering that the orders in our sample correspond to a period of 172 days,
we have on average 2020 orders per day. The classification algorithm must be fast
enough to evaluate larger amounts of data per day, as the company is growing
rapidly, so are its sales.
The following sub-sections present the most relevant results from the ex-
ploratory analysis on the relationship between individual variables and the occur-
rence of fraud.
4.2.1 Time when an order is placed
In order to have a better understanding of the influence of the time dimension in
the data, we studied the variable OrderTimeCustomer which holds the information
about the time at the customer’s location when he placed the order.
On Figure 4.3a we can notice that there is a peak in the chart around 4am.
This chart plots the ratio of fraudulent orders among all the orders placed in that
hour of the day. Hence, the peak tells us that about 3.7% of all orders placed between
4 and 5am were fraudulent. We can tell from this figure that there is a trend for
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(a) Fraud by time of day. (b) Number of orders by time of day.
Figure 4.3: Distribution of orders by time of day when they are placed.
Table 4.3: Division of fraudulent orders between day and night periods
23pm to 10am 10am to 23pm
% all fraudulent orders 31% 69%
orders placed between midnight and 6am to have a higher number of fraudulent
orders among them.
On the right, on Figure 4.3b, we can see the number of orders placed at each
time of the day. A slope in the number of orders placed is noticeable between 1
and 9am. It is interesting to note that the number of orders placed at each hour is
relatively stable between 10am and 23pm.
We can conclude that the great majority of fraudulent orders are placed during
day time (10-23h) as is confirmed on Table 4.3. However, the orders placed during
the night have a higher probability of being fraudulent.
We recommend the fraud analysts to place a special attention to the orders
which are placed during the period when it is night at the location of the customer.
4.2.2 Product gender
Very few orders include both products for men and for women. Hence, we consider
an order of the gender “Women” if the majority of products in that order are of
that type (e.g. three items for women and one item for men). The same goes for
products of the gender “Men” and “Other”, which includes all unisex products. This
abstraction makes it easier for us to study the patterns of fraud related to product
genders.
There is a noticeable majority of orders whose products’ gender is “Women”,
as can be seen from Figure 4.4b. Despite the majority of orders being for products
with gender “Women”, two thirds (65%) of all fraudulent orders are of products of
the gender “Men”.
When taking a closer look at the occurrence of fraud in each of the genders in
Figure 4.4a, we notice that only 0.9% of “Women” product orders are fraudulent,
while this number reaches 3.9% for “Men” and 3.1% for “Other”. One can conclude,
that there is a higher prevalence of fraud in orders of products for men and unisex
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(a) Fraudulent orders by Gender. (b) Number of orders by Gender.
Figure 4.4: Distribution of variable product gender.
(a) Distribution of variable quantity in le-
gitimate and fraudulent orders.
(b) Distribution of variable order value in
legitimate and fraudulent orders.
Figure 4.5: Distribution of variables quantity and order value.
products.
4.2.3 Order quantity and value
As both the order quantity and value had a very high number of outliers, we applied
a winsorizing technique to remove outliers before drawing the chat on Figures 4.5a
and 4.5b. The data was only altered for plotting purposes, the data used for training
was not subjected to this function.
It can be seen on Figure 4.5a that fraudulent orders have a tendency to include
a higher quantity of items than legitimate orders. It can be seen from the box plot
that only 5% of all legitimate orders have more than three items, while that level
corresponds to 25% of the fraudulent orders.
When it comes to the value of the order, we can observe the same pattern:
fraudulent orders have on average a higher value. This can been seen on Figure
4.5b, where to two box plot graphs are slightly misaligned.
4.2.4 Payment type
Credit card and PayPal are the two main types of payment used in this dataset.
Other payment types exist, but are negligible as can be seen on Figure 4.6b.
Figure 4.6a tells us that purchases made using a credit card happen to be
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(a) Fraudulent orders by Payment Type. (b) Number of orders by Payment Type.
Figure 4.6: Distribution of variable PaymentType.
fraudulent more often than purchases using PayPal. In fact, almost 2.5% of all
credit card purchases are fraudulent, vs. 0.6% for PayPal. This is mainly due to the
security measures implemented by the PayPal service, which make it such a popular
alternative to credit cards as was discussed in Chapter 1 (Introduction).
4.2.5 Browser
The next analysis focused on recognizing differences in the level of fraud of orders
made with different web browsers. On Figure 4.7a, we notice a significant difference
in the level of fraud between browsers. Circa 6% of all orders made with the Firefox
browser were fraudulent, while this value only reached circa 1.2% of the orders made
with Safari. On an intermediate level, 3% of the orders made with Chrome were
fraudulent.
In order to know how many orders (legitimate and fraudulent) were made with
each browser, we studied Figure 4.7b. About half of all orders were made with Safari
(of which only circa 1.2% were fraud, as seen before).
These results tell us that the Browser used is probably a very explanatory
variable. Before this study, the information about Browser used to make the pur-
chase was not available for the Order Processing Team. We recommend that this
variable be taken in consideration by this team, in particular that special attention
is paid to orders made with the Browser Firefox.
4.2.6 Interaction with photos
In the scope of studying the variables about the behaviour of the user on the website
before making the purchase, we studied the variable InteractedWithPhotos which
tells us whether the user has clicked on photos of products. The rationale behind
this, was the intuition that fraudsters are not as interested in the product they are
buying as legitimate users and might add items to their basket without inspecting
their images.
In fact, orders where the user did not interact with photos on the day of the
purchase have a higher probability of fraud. On Figure 4.8a we see that there are
circa 3.6% of fraudulent orders out of all those where there was no interaction with
photos, while only 1.4% in the case that inspection of the photos had happened.
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(a) Occurrence of frauds by browser. (b) Number of orders by browser.
Figure 4.7: Distribution of variable Browser.
(a) Occurrence of fraud. (b) ’Number of orders.
Figure 4.8: Occurrence of fraud and total number of orders when user interacted with product photos
before purchase or not.
Figure 4.8b shows the occurrence of each of the two cases in the total amount
of orders studied. We see that circa one third of all orders are not preceded by
interaction with the photos.
As with the information about the Browser used in the purchase, the behaviour
of the user towards photographs, was not taken into account or even available to the
Order Processing Team. After our analysis, we recommended that this information
be displayed in the order approval dashboard and that the fraud analysts consider
no interaction with photos as a suspicious sign of fraud.
4.2.7 Distribution of frauds per country
In order to understand the geographical dimension of fraud, we studied the occur-
rence of frauds in orders shipped to different countries. First, we calculated the ratio
of fraudulent orders over the total number of orders in each country i :
Fraudratioi =
FraudulentOrdersi
TotalOrders
(4.1)
Countries with less than 30 orders, have been considered not significant and
excluded from this analysis.
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Figure 4.9: Fraudulent orders in each destination country.
The result of equation (4.1) is a list of pairs (country,ratio). We have plotted
this list on a map of the world, as seen on figure 4.9. The darker colours represent
countries where a bigger share of orders shipped to this country were fraudulent.
The lighter colours represent the countries with a lower fraud level and countries in
white are those which were excluded.
Mexico, Peru, Algeria, Angola, France, Ireland, South-Africa and Indonesia
are some of the countries with a higher rate of frauds. This result is in line with
the empirical experience of the Order Processing Team. When an order for any of
these countries is placed, a fraud analyst must pay especial attention to it and look
for other indications of fraud.
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Chapter 5
Modelling and evaluation
5.1 Data transformation
The exploratory analysis presented in the previous chapter gives a first insight re-
garding the relevance and behaviour of each variable when detecting fraud. In this
chapter we show how to transform and include the studied data set in machine
learning algorithms, which will automatically combine those variables in a system-
atic and effective way. At the end, models are compared and the best is chosen for
deployment in the case study.
In order to use machine learning algorithms such as Support Vector Machines,
one must transform all categorical variables into numerical. Moreover, these must
also be transformed through a standardization process, so that all values have the
same scale [Miner et al., 2009].
We begin by filtering the variables which could not be used in the model, as
described in Section 5.1.1. Next we perform transformations in order to make sure
that all variables have a numeric representation, through one-hot-encoding (Section
5.1.2) and risk-level grouping (Section 5.1.3). We engineer new features through the
use of several functions, detailed in Section 5.1.4.
It was seen on Section 4.2 that some variables had missing values. This is
corrected by imputing a likely value, as described in Section 5.1.5. Lastly, the
variables are standardized to the same value range, which is done according to
Section 5.1.6.
All these transformations were applied separately on the training and testing
set in order not to “contaminate” the data. For instance, the parameters for stan-
dardization of the training set were saved and used for the standardization of the
testing set, as it would not be possible to calculate such parameters from a single
new observation.
5.1.1 Feature selection
Unfortunately, not all variables which were studied in Chapter 4 could be used
in the deployment stage. This constraint comes from the difficulty in calculating
such variables when evaluating a new order. In particular, the variables related
to the session of the user: device and browser used, number of page views, number
of sessions, time spent on the website and interaction with photos, could not be
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Table 5.1: Example of one-hot-encoding: variable PaymentType is transformed into 4 dummy vari-
ables
Order Payment Type
1 Type A
2 Type B
3 Type C
4 Type A
5 Type A
6 Type D
−→
Order Type A Type B Type C Type D
1 1 0 0 0
2 0 1 0 0
3 0 0 1 0
4 1 0 0 0
5 1 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 1
accessed from the database in real time.
It would be possible to use them to train the algorithm, because they exist in
the order history. However, we chose not to count on them in order to use a model
which would work as closely as possible to the reality. The use of theses variable is
an option for a future upgrade of the model.
The categorical variables which were considered for feature engineering, but
had no meaning by themselves, were also deleted. This included all the address and
name information. Other categorical variables were transformed as seen in sections
5.1.2 and 5.1.3.
5.1.2 One-hot-encoding for low-dimensional categorical variables
Categorical variables with few categories were transformed into several features
through one-hot-encoding. One-hot-encoding is a method which consists of en-
coding a variable through binary numbers. In our case, we created one column for
each of the categories of the variable. An example of this transformation can be
seen on Table 5.1. This technique will allow the model to fit such variables, but as
the dimensionality grows the model looses generality [Miner et al., 2009]. Hence,
one-hot-encoding should not be applied to variables with an extensive number of
categories, as to do so would increase the dimensionality of the sample too much.
5.1.3 Risk-level grouping for high-dimensional categorical variables
Variables such as the address country include too many categories (more than
200 different countries) to be transformed into individual features through one-
hot-encoding. The choice was to transform the variables sCountry and sCity into
features which translate the risk associated with each of the countries.
We calculated the value of the fraud ratio for each country as described in
Section 4.2.7. Following that, the countries have been clustered in four groups.
The clustering technique used is called Jenks natural breaks optimization (one-
dimensional variant of k-means)and was developed by the cartographer George Jenks
[of Kansas. Dept. of Geography and Jenks, 1977]. This technique seeks to minimize
within-group variance, while maximizing between-group variance.
The number of clusters (four) was chosen by considering what could be a rea-
sonable number of risk levels in such a problem. Alternatively, an iterative method
for choosing the number of classes could have been used (North [2009] proposes such
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a solution). Further alternatives could include creating individual features only for
each of the most represented categories (e.g. US as the most represented category
of variable sCountry).
The chosen method, to group categories into risk-level groups, does not take
into account any multivariate effect, because the label “fraud” is the only criterion
used for this risk evaluation. The method was however, the most practical way to
transform the categories without greatly increasing the dimensionality of the sample.
This transformation was calculated using data from the training set only.
When transforming an entry from the testing set, we check which risk-level had been
assigned to that category in the training. Had such a category not been assigned a
risk-level before (e.g. a country where no order from the training set was shipped
to), the risk-level is set to the intermediate level 2.
5.1.4 Engineered variables
In order to get more significant variables to train the models with, we engineered
new variables through abstraction and combination of variables.
The first engineered variables were created to represent the degree of similarity
between certain pairs of categorical variables. We created a binary function which
generated a new feature with the value of 1 in case of a match and 0 in case of no
match. This function was applied to the pairs of variables {(billing country, shipping
country), (billing country, card country), (shipping country, card country)}. These
were all predefined country fields, which ensured the match could be done by a
simple comparison of strings.
On the other hand, the variables referring to names (e.g. name on card, user
name) would often not match because the names were spelled in different order.
Hence, we used another function which calculates the similarity between two names.
This function is based on n-gram similarity and its output is a continuous number
in [0,1]. It was applied to the pairs of variables {(UserName, CardName), (billing
city, shipping city), (billing zip-code, shipping zip-code)}.
A function which confirms that the customer has entered a valid telephone
number was also created, by checking whether the input of the user is a number.
Lastly, a function summarizing the customer’s recent buying behaviour was
created. This function counts the number of orders by this customer in the ten days
prior to the current purchase. The complete list of variables which were used in
training can be seen in Table A.1.
5.1.5 Imputing missing values
In order to get the best performance of the machine learning algorithms, the data
must be clean and complete. As was seen in section 4.2, there were missing values
in the data set. We chose to complete these data entries by imputing a value in the
missing variables, as suggested by Miner et al. [2009].
In the case of categorical variables, a missing value would correspond to a zero
in each of the corresponding columns after the one-hot-encoding transformation.
Hence, no further action was required.
In the case of numerical variables, the missing value was replaced by the mean
of the sample. As an example, a missing value for OrderValue would be substituted
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by the average order value of the sample of the training set. These parameters were
saved and used for imputing missing values in the testing set.
5.1.6 Standardization of numerical variables using the Min-Max
method
Support Vector Machines and other machine learning methods require data variables
to be in the same range. In our case, variables which are measured in different units
such as Quantity or OrderValue were standardized to values between 0 and 1, so
that they can more easily be compared.
Among the several techniques for standardization, we chose to use Min-Max.
This technique was preferred over the commonly used Z-value standardization, be-
cause it transforms variables to the range [0,1], which is consistent with the range of
the many binary variables in the model. Indeed, Shalabi et al. [2006] compared three
different techniques and concluded that the Min-Max method is the best design for
standardization in data mining projects. Equation (5.1) describes the transforma-
tion applied to each numeric variable through the Min-Max scaling.
X ′ =
X −Xmin
Xmax −Xmin (5.1)
5.2 Model Selection
This section describes our work in selecting the model and parameters to use for the
order classification. The models for study were Logistic Regression, Random Forests
and Support Vector Machines. The choice of the models and respective parameters
was done by applying cross-validation on the training set.
5.2.1 Performance measures
Before evaluating the results of each model, we had to decide which would be the
performance measures to compare.
For each observation X, we have an associated real class label from the set
{0,1} and a corresponding predicted label. Observations which are classified cor-
rectly as belonging to class 1 are called true positives, while observations correctly
classified as class 0 are called true negatives. There are two other possible outcomes
in which the prediction incurs in an error. The type I error occurs when the positive
class is predicted, but the observation label is 0, these predictions are called false
positives. The type II error occurs when the prediction of class 0 does not agree with
the observation’s true class which would be 1. Such errors are called false negatives.
The two types of error can have different implications. In the case of fraud detection,
a false positive error would correspond to a legitimate observation being labelled as
fraud. A false negative error would happen in the case of a fraudulent transaction
being classified as legitimate.
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Table 5.2: Example of confusion matrix
Real class
0 1
Predicted
0 True Negative False Negative
1 False Positive True Positive
The most common way to visualize the error rate in classification problems is
to draw a confusion matrix. This matrix depicts four quadrants with the number of
true negatives, false negatives, false positives and true positives, respectively.
Several performance measures can be derived from the confusion matrix:
True Positive Rate (known as Recall) =
True Positives
True Positives + False Negatives
True Negative Rate (known as Specificity) =
True Negatives
True Negatives + False Positives
Negative Predictive Value =
True Negatives
True Negatives + False Negatives
Positive Predictive Value (known as Precision) =
True Positives
True Positives + False Positives
However, we can build a confusion matrix only if we can map each prediction
to one of the classes. In the case of classifiers such as Random Forests, the output is
a continuous value, that represents a score which tells us how close the observation
is to 0 or 1. Therefore, a threshold must be defined in order to determine the final
class (0 or 1), based on the real value obtained with the classifier.
ROC curves The Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (ROC) offers a way of
visualizing different outcomes. Fawcett [2006] describes ROC curves as depicting
the relative trade-offs between benefits (true positives) and costs (false positives).
Observations with a score under the threshold are classified as class 0, while a score
above the threshold would predict that the observation belongs to class 1. A ROC
curve plots the true positive rate and false positive rate for each threshold between
−∞ and +∞ [Fawcett, 2006].
An example of a ROC curve can be seen on Figure 5.1. The point (0,1) in
the ROC graph would correspond to the perfect classifier, one which would not
incur in any false positive classification and would get 100% of the true positive
observations. On the contrary, the point (1,0) corresponds to the worst possible
classifier. The closer the curve is to the top left corner, the better the performance
of that classifier. A way of interpreting this graph is to use the area under the curve
(AUC) as a measure of performance. Hanley and McNeil [1982] showed that the
AUC is equivalent to the probability that the classifier will give a higher score to
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Figure 5.1: Example of a Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (ROC)
a randomly chosen observation of class 1 than to a randomly chosen observation
of class 0. Fawcett [2006] notes that the AUC performs very well in practice as a
general measure of classifier performance.
Precision-recall Precision-Recall (PR) curves have been used as an alternative
performance measure to ROC. In a PR graph, we plot the precision and recall for
each threshold. Davis and Goadrich [2006] studied the relationship between PR and
ROC curves. One of the conclusion of this study is that optimizing the AUC-ROC
will not guarantee the best result in AUC-PR. Therefore, we chose to use AUC-PR as
the last measure of comparison between the performance of the different hypothesis
in cross-validation.
5.2.2 Cross-validation
We want to state a hypothesis about a model which can make the best predictions
about the distribution of our data. In order to do so we choose three families of
models: Logistic Regression, Support Vector Machines and Random Forests. From
these, we want to know which set of parameters generates a hypothesis which yields
the best performance.
The whole data set was previously split into training and testing sets. Now a
further split is performed on the training set. Part is used in actual training, while
the rest, which we call the validation set, is used to help us find the best parameters
of each model. We train the algorithm on a part of the training set and use the rest
of the observations – the validation set – to test that hypothesis. The advantage
in using a validation set is that the rest of the data in the training set has already
been used in training the algorithm and is therefore not appropriate to be used in
evaluating that same algorithm. The main negative aspect of validation is that it
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Figure 5.2: Example of the division of the dataset for cross-validation and testing
reduces the size of the training set.
Cross-validation is a modified way of doing validation. Instead of splitting
the training set in two parts (training and validation), we can estimate the perfor-
mance by repeating the training-validation procedure multiple times. One type of
cross-validation is called the leave-one-out technique. With this technique we would
train the algorithm on all data points N-1 and validate the hypothesis on the one
point which was left out. We would then repeat this procedure N times and the
performance measures would be estimated from that sample of results of size N.
However, this approach suffers from the problem of requiring great computational
time and it is not used in practice.
K-fold cross-validation is another type of cross-validation, which mitigates the
problem of computational time. The training set is divided in K folds, with each of
the folds being left out at a time for the training-validation sequence, as ilustrated on
Figure 5.2. Abu-Mostafa et al. [2012] suggest 10-fold cross-validation as the common
practice.
Algorithm 1: Cross-validation
Data: training dataset
Result: Estimate of performance of models with different parameters
initialization;
foreach Parameter set do
Load classifier with new parameters
Split into K-fold validation sets
for k ∈ K do
Train on train set
Test on validation set
Calculate performance measures - AUC-ROC and AUC-PR
end
Calculate mean and variance of the performance measures in the K
validation runs
end
Algorithm 1 describes the steps implemented to do cross-validation. This
procedure was repeated for the three models: Random Forests, Support Vector
Machines and Logistic Regression. We validated several combinations of parameters
for each model. The choice of the parameters to test was done by grid search, a
technique which consists of performing an exhaustive search through a predefined
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space of parameters. In some cases, a refined grid search was additionally performed
after finding a suitable subset of the parameter space.
We also compared results when training on a balanced sample (i.e. equal
number of fraudulent and legitimate records) achieved by randomly under-sampling
the legitimate records vs. an unbalanced sample of all records. Each training set had
347.572 records of which 312.814 were used for training and 34.758 for validation at
a time. In the case of under-sampling, the records used for training were reduced
to a number around 13.000 (circa two times the number of fraudulent cases in nine
tenths of the records), while the validation was done on all 34.758 records from the
validation fold.
Random Forests and Logistic Regression were validated with both balanced
and unbalanced data sets. Support Vector Machines has a much higher computa-
tional complexity and therefore it was just trained on the balanced sets generated
by under-sampling.
Random Forests Random Forests is an ensemble method proposed by Breiman
[2001] which consists of creating many decision trees and combining their estimates.
The parameters which were varied were the minimum number of features to split
each node of the tree (Min. Split), the criterion for quality of node split (ginni
impurity or entropy), the number of trees, and whether a balanced set was used
(under-sampling). The number of trees is not a true parameter, as more trees will
always lead to a higher performance, but also more computational time. In fact,
the better results were obtained with the highest number of trees we used (1500).
However, the performance was practically the same as the performance when using
1200 or 900 trees. The top five results of this grid search can be seen on Table 5.3.
Under-sampling did not lead to a better performance. In fact, there is no
indication that using a balanced sample by under-sampling will achieve a higher
performance (see Appendix B). Regarding the criterion for split, it is clear that the
best performance is achieved by using the entropy criterion.
Support Vector Machines Support Vector Machines is an advanced statistical
classifier, which can make use of a kernel trick to map the data to a high dimen-
sional feature space. We used an implementation of Support Vector Machines which
yields a continuous probabilistic output. We employed a radial basis function kernel
(RBF ). The kernel coefficient Gamma and regularization term C were varied in a
logarithmic scale. A high regularization term represents a weaker regularization.
The best results were obtained for a value of C =10, as can be seen from Table 5.3.
Logistic Regression Logistic Regression is a widely used method for classifi-
cation and regression. Due to memory limitations, we could not train a logistic
regression on a higher order representation of the features (e.g. second or third
order transformation). Like in Support Vector Machines, we varied the regulariza-
tion term. The only solver used was an implementation of the Limited-memory
Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (lbfgs) optimization algorithm.
Validation results From Table 5.3, we can conclude that the performance of
Support Vector Machines and Logistic Regression is similar. The best performance
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Table 5.3: Results of cross-validation
Panel A: Grid search results for Random Forests
Random Forests
Num trees Min. Split Criterion Under-sampling AUC-PR AUC-ROC
1500 10 entropy No 0,479 0,935
1500 12 entropy No 0,477 0,935
1500 11 entropy No 0,475 0,935
1500 6 entropy No 0,475 0,935
1500 16 entropy No 0,474 0,935
Panel B: Grid search results for Support Vector Machines
Support Vector Machines
C Gamma Kernel Under-sampling AUC-PR AUC-ROC
10 0,0464 RBF Yes 0,337 0,906
10 0,0215 RBF Yes 0,336 0,902
10 0,01 RBF Yes 0,319 0,896
10 0,1 RBF Yes 0,317 0,903
1 0,1 RBF Yes 0,305 0,895
Panel C: Grid search results for Logistic Regression
Logistic Regression
C Solver Under-sampling AUC-PR AUC-ROC
100,00 lbfgs No 0,360 0,907
3,16 lbfgs No 0,357 0,905
1,00 lbfgs No 0,349 0,902
0,32 lbfgs No 0,324 0,895
3,16 lbfgs Yes 0,313 0,903
is achieved by Random Forests. The AUC-ROC is slightly higher than in the other
two models and the AUC-PR is considerably higher. Taking this results into account
we conclude that the best model for this problem is Random Forests.
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Table 5.4: Testing results of the Random Forests model.
Classifier AUC-PR AUC-ROC
Random Forests 0,333 0,880
5.2.3 Testing results
After choosing the model, we want to estimate the performance of this algorithm on
new data. We finally come to use the testing set which we separated from the rest
of our data as described in Section 4.1.4. The performance in cross-validation has
an optimistic bias, thus we expected to get a lower performance in testing.
The purpose of testing is to estimate the performance of the model which we
chose in training – Random Forests – with the parameters which achieved the best
performance as seen in Section 5.2.2. This time, the complete data from the training
set was used to train the classifier.
Table 5.4 shows the results of testing. Contrary to the performance results in
validation (see Section 5.2.2), the value of the area under the precision-recall curve
(AUC-PR) was not so satisfactory. However, Random Forests still presented a high
value for the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC-ROC).
The complete curves can be seen on Figure 5.3, on Figure 5.3a we can see the ROC
curve. To the right on Figure 5.3b, we have the plot of the precision-recall curve.
We will further explore these results.
Table 5.5 shows the results of the suspicion scores estimated by Random
Forests on the testing data, divided by bins of 5 basis points. The ratio of frauds
per total orders increases monotonously with the score, which is a sign that higher
scores represent a higher probability of fraud. The distribution of scores for legiti-
mate and for fraudulent orders can be seen on the histograms on Figure 5.4. On the
left, we see the distribution of the scores which were estimated for legitimate orders.
On the right the scores estimated for fraudulent orders. The first thing to notice is
that the distributions are different, which is a sign that the classifier recognized the
two classes. There is a high occurrence of low scores for legitimate orders, which
is what we would expect. On the other hand, fraudulent orders have a rather even
distribution of scores. It would be expected that more fraudulent orders had high
scores (near the value 1). This is a consequence of the imbalanced data set used
for training, as the classifier can very well identify legitimate orders but has more
difficulties with fraudulent observations.
Alternative results are shown in Appendix C. A higher AUC-PR indicates that
using certain additional features in training, would increase performance. However,
this case was only tested to provide an incentive for the company to develop their
systems in order to enable the use of such features.
We must define a score threshold for considering a transaction legitimate or
fraudulent based on its suspicion score. Once the threshold is defined, we can cal-
culate business metrics such as the number of chargebacks (false negatives) and the
number of refusals of legitimate payments (false positives). One approach to define
the threshold is to look for the value which originates the point of the curve closest
to the top left corner in the ROC space. The intersection of the Recall and Speci-
ficity curves in Figure 5.5 is mapped to the threshold value (0.22) which achieves
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(a) ROC curve. (b) Precision-Recall curve.
Figure 5.3: ROC and PR curves of testing results with Random Forests algorithm.
Table 5.5: Number of legitimate and fraudulent orders whose score falls into each range
Range Total Fraud OK Ratio
0 - 5 52469 180 52289 0,34
5 - 10 13510 159 13351 1,18
10 - 15 6810 127 6683 1,86
15 - 20 3828 115 3713 3
20 - 25 2941 111 2830 3,77
25 - 30 2197 109 2088 4,96
30 - 35 1445 106 1339 7,34
35 - 40 1022 112 910 10,96
40 - 45 914 161 753 17,61
45 - 50 564 129 435 22,87
50 - 55 365 110 255 30,14
55 - 60 213 86 127 40,38
60 - 65 194 102 92 52,58
65 - 70 190 85 105 44,74
70 - 75 111 57 54 51,35
75 - 80 59 51 8 86,44
80 - 85 43 42 1 97,67
85 - 90 17 17 0 100
90 - 95 1 1 0 100
95 - 100 0 0 0 -
38 Chapter 5. Modelling and evaluation
(a) Scores of legitimate orders. (b) Scores of fraudulent orders.
Figure 5.4: Histograms of score predictions for each of the labels.
Figure 5.5: Plot of Recall and Specificity for each threshold.
the compromise between the two measures.
Fixating the threshold at 0.22, we can draw the confusion matrix of results,
which can be seen on Table 5.6.
5.2.4 Discussion of results
Table 5.6 shows a high number of false positives (9.09%). In case this classifier would
be processing all orders, the estimated number of chargebacks would be of 0.71%
(number of false negatives), while 1.42% of all orders would be correctly rejected as
fraudulent. However, it is not realistic that such a classifier would be implemented
by itself in an e-tail situation such as in our case study.
It is important to relate the performance measures to the data mining ob-
jectives of the project and the business goals. Hence, we must also estimate the
performance for the case of using the classifier together with manual review. This
approach can give us much more interesting results.
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Table 5.6: Confusion matrix of results when setting threshold at c=0.22.
Legitimate (actual) Fraud (actual) Total
Legitimate (predict) 77129 (88.76%) 618 (0.71%) 77747
Fraud (predict) 7904 (9.09%) 1242 (1.42%) 9146
Figure 5.6: Plot of automation level and fraud.
The new approach is based on the assumption that all orders below the thresh-
old would be automatically approved, while the rest (orders with higher score) would
be manually reviewed. Then we chose the score threshold based on the number of
orders which can be manually reviewed. In accordance with the business objectives,
we determined the level of automation to be at 80%. Hence, the threshold was set
at the value which is higher than 80% of the score of all orders. The advantage of
this approach is that it can be easily adapted to new business requirements. If the
company is interested in taking a lower risk, it can choose to decrease the number of
automatically approved orders. Figure 5.6 shows how many fraudulent orders would
be automatically approved if we vary the level of automation.
When choosing the level of automation, we can build a confusion matrix based
on a few assumptions, such as:
• The score threshold splits the orders which would be automatically approved
(score under the threshold) from the ones which would be reviewed (score
above the threshold);
• When a fraudulent order is manually reviewed, there is a 75% probability that
it will be refused;
• When a legitimate order is manually reviewed, there is a 90% probability that
it will be accepted.
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Table 5.7: Confusion matrix of results when automatically approving 80% records with lowest esti-
mated suspicion scores.
Legitimate (actual) Fraud (actual) Total
Legitimate (predict) 83441 (96.02%) 768 (0.88%) 83914
Fraud (predict) 1592 (1.83%) 1092 (1.25%) 2684
Automation level: 80%
Recall: 0.587
Specificity: 0.981
Fallout: 0.019
Precision: 0.407
Hence, the number of items approved can be calculated as:
True Negatives =Legitimate orders automatically accepted (5.2)
+ 0.9× Legitimate orders manually reviewed
False Negatives =Fraudulent orders automatically accepted (5.3)
+ (1− 0.75)× Fraudulent order manually reviewed
False Positives =(1− 0.9)× Legitimate orders manually reviewed (5.4)
True Positives =0.75× Fraudulent orders manually reviewed (5.5)
Table 5.7 shows the results of the combination of automatic classifier with
manual review, under the assumptions mentioned before. The results show a high
value of specificity. Specificity can be interpreted as the fraction of legitimate orders
which are approved. With our results, circa 98% of legitimate orders would be
approved. On the other hand, the recall or sensitivity value is rather low. Only
circa 59% of the fraudulent orders would be refused. Precision is the fraction of
fraudulent orders out of all which were refused. We can see that 41% of the refused
orders were actually fraudulent. Fallout can be interpreted as the “false alarm” rate,
i.e. the probability of falsely rejecting a legitimate order. This value is equal to 1
minus the value of specificity, at circa 2%.
The combination of the Random Forests classifier with the manual revision
of orders, seems to yield very good results in increasing the automation level and
having a low rate of customer insults (fallout). The maximization of the number of
chargebacks avoided (recall) is not so successful. However, we believe that this is a
limitation of the problem of fraud detection itself, as fraudsters work hard to hide
their intentions, as previously mentioned.
The Random Forests models also allows us to estimate the relative importance
of each of the features. We can see the importance of the top 10 attributes on
Table 5.8. Attributes which were represented by many features such as the product
brand have been aggregated into one attribute in order to have a better overview
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Table 5.8: Relative importance of the top 10 attributes.
Importance Feature Description
13,3% TimeSinceFirstOrder Time elapsed since user’s first
purchase at Farfetch
10,3% OrderValue Value of order
7,6% Brand All the features describing the
product brand
6,3% sCity RiskLevel Engineered variable - risk level
associated with shipping city
6,1% Quantity Quantity of items in the order
5,9% Gender Gender of items in the order
5,4% Similarity (User-
Name/CardName)
Engineered variable - similarity
between username and name on credit
card
4,9% NumCardsUsed Number of cards used by customer at
Farfetch
4,9% PaymentAttempts Payment attempts by user for this
order
4,6% OrderTimeGMT Absolute time at which the order is
placed
of their importance. The importance of each variable is calculated as the “mean
decrease impurity”, described in Breiman et al. [1984].
We can note that the time since the customer’s first order is the most im-
portant attribute. The value and quantity of items in the order also appear to be
relevant features. On the product perspective, its brand and gender are together
responsible for the same level of importance as the customer’s first order date. The
risk associated with the city where the order will be shipped to is the fourth most
important attribute. A few features related to the payment itself also show signifi-
cant importance. These are the similarity between the name on the credit card and
the name of the customer, the number of cards used by the customer in all his orders
at this merchant and the number of repeated payments attempts for this order.
Other variables such as the currency used or the similarity between billing and
shipping address ranked lower in terms of relative importance. The information we
get from this analysis can be of use to improve the manual review process and in
building new models in the future.
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5.3 Deployment at Farfetch
The deployment of the selected model involves additional issues, such as the way the
model will be updated (i.e. periodically trained with new data) and the integration
with Farfetch’s existing systems and services. This section explores these issues and
shows some of the first results Farfetch is getting from using our solution.
5.3.1 Order Classification Service
In order to maintain the relevance of the classifier, it is important to update the data
used for training. We created a recurring job on the database server to update the
table where the data set is saved. This job runs two procedures: one which aggre-
gates the information about the new orders and appends it to the table, and a second
procedure which updates the variable LabelFraud in case there was a chargeback on
the payment of an order.
The final model is to be integrated in the order classification service. This
application will evaluate new orders and return a suspicion score. It contains two
main procedures:
1. Training the algorithm
2. Classifying orders
Figure 5.7 illustrates the main parts of the system. Training the algorithm
happens once every week. After the data set in the database has been updated,
the training script will download the records. As was seen in Section 4.1.3, it takes
several weeks a chargeback is submitted. Thus, the training script will only use data
from orders up to four months before the current time. As there is no need for a
testing set, all downloaded data is used in training. The output of the training is
a set of parameters for the transformation of the data and a classifier which will
generate the suspicion score.
The classification service runs continuously, only stopping when loading new
parameters after the training occurs. When a new order is placed on the Farfetch
portal, it will be submitted for evaluation through the classification service’s appli-
cation programming interface (API). At first, the service will parse the information
on the request to map each field to the respective variable. Not all variables used
in classification are inherent to the order. This practical issue prevents all required
information to be sent together with the request. The application must make its
own request to the database to query the extra information, such as the time of
the first purchase of this user. Finally, the service will apply the transformation
functions to the data, so that it will generate the exact same features as in training.
The preprocessing parameters saved from the training, such as risk-level mapping
of countries are used in this step.
With all the features in the right format, the classifier is called to estimate the
suspicion score for the order. This score is returned as the answer of the classification
request.
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Figure 5.7: Diagram of the Order Classification System
5.3.2 Results of implementation
The time between a issuing a single request and getting the answer from the Order
Classification Service amounts to circa 1200ms. During out tests, batches of fifty
requests were processed in circa 1min30s. This is more than enough for a prompt
response.
Figure 5.8 shows the first results of scores evaluated by this service in real
time at Farfetch. At this stage, the classification service is taking no direct decision
to approve or reject orders, but estimating the suspicion score. We will not know
for sure which orders were fraudulent before a few months have passed, but we
can compare the scores estimated for orders which were cancelled by the Order
Processing Team for suspicion of fraud, against those of orders which have been
accepted. Figure 5.8a shows the distribution of scores for all those orders which
were accepted. On the right, Figure 5.8b shows this distribution of scores for the
orders which were not accepted. The clear difference in the distribution of scores in
the two cases, indicates that the classifier has distinguished between these orders. A
further analysis should compare the results of orders which originated chargebacks.
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(a) Orders not cancelled. (b) Orders cancelled for fraud suspicion.
Figure 5.8: Comparison of scores distributions of orders approved vs. cancelled by Order Processing
Team.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
This work addressed the problem of fraud detection for retailers doing business
online. The project had the goal of developing a risk scoring solution through the
use of data mining techniques, which was met with the implementation of such a
system at the case study e-tail merchant Farfetch.
One of the limitations encountered was that a single online retailer does not
have a lot of information about the customer it is doing business with. For instance,
it would not know if this customer has been banned from other websites. For this
reason, it is imperative that the retailer uses the available data as best as possible.
The choice of which variables to use was very important and could be done thanks
to the empirical experience provided by the fraud analysts at the case study com-
pany. Besides, it was important to explore the database and understand which other
variables could be used, which were not obvious at first.
The most relevant features turned out to be features which were engineered
out of one or multiple base variables. The time since the customer’s first order, the
similarity measures between names or the grouping of cities by risk are examples
of such features. The exploratory analysis showed which variables are particularly
relevant on their own, as an indicator of fraud. The patterns identified in this
analysis can be used to improve fraud detection through manual review. Future
work comparing different transformation functions and providing guidance on which
features to engineer would be very useful for this area. We recommend studying the
possibility of grouping addresses, which would require matching addresses that are
spelled differently.
We confirmed that supervised learning methods are applicable to fraud detec-
tion in an e-tail merchant setting. The three machine learning algorithms tested,
Logistic Regression, Support Vector Machines and Random Forests, provided good
results. Random Forests achieved the highest performance. This algorithm seems
to be very adequate to be used for fraud detection due to its good performance,
combined with ease of implementation and fast computation time even with large
datasets. We concluded that using a balanced set of observations through under-
sampling of legitimate records, was not significantly different in performance than
using the much bigger imbalanced full set of records. We would suggest future work
to explore whether oversampling of fraudulent records would lead to a different
conclusion.
The testing results with the Random Forests algorithm showed that such a
model would perform well enough to be of practical application. The advantages
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of a data mining approach are the possibility of automatically processing a large
volume of orders, allowing e-tail businesses to expand sustainably. When using
a continuous classifier such as Random Forests, it is critical to choose the score
threshold for considering an order to be legitimate or fraudulent. We came up with
an approach based on the assumption that the merchant will manually review orders
with a score above the threshold, instead of directly cancelling them. We provide
the merchant the possibility to define the threshold by choosing the share of orders
which should be automatically processed. We recommend the exploration of other
ways to choose the score threshold, such as methods based on the business targets for
fraud tolerance and customer insult rates. Such a cost-based performance measure
could be used in training the algorithm in order to further direct learning towards
the intended business outcomes.
The results obtained, under the assumption that 80% of the orders in the
testing set with the lowest scores would be automatically approved and the rest
reviewed manually, showed a very high number of legitimate orders approved and a
false alarm rate of only circa 2%. On the other hand, the probability of rejecting a
fraudulent order was only of circa 59%. Still, the number of chargebacks would be
at 0.88% which is well under the industry average of 1.6% for international orders
in North America [CyberSource, 2013].
The contribution for Farfetch was the implementation of this approach as a
risk scoring application. The system developed extracts the data from the database,
prepares it, trains the algorithm and runs a web application which gets requests
with order details and estimates the risk score for the order. At the end of this
project, the system was implemented at Farfetch and the first results of real-time
order evaluations are now being assessed.
Finally, this work details the many steps that need to be taken to develop
a complete application of fraud detection. We hope that our case study provided
some insights into fraud detection in the perspective of merchants and that others
will be motivated by it to further explore the problem of presenting solutions for
fraud detection in e-tail.
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Table A.1: Final list of features used in training.
# Name Values
1 LabelFraud {0,1}
2 OrderTimeGMT [0,23]
3 OrderValue R>0
4 CV2Code match {0,0.5,1}
5 AVSCode match {0,0.5,1}
6 Quantity Z>0
7 FamClothing Z≥0
- ...
16 FamOther Z≥0
17 GenderMen Z≥0
18 GenderWomen Z≥0
19 GenderOther Z≥0
20 BrandDOLCEGABBANA Z≥0
- ...
41 BrandOther Z≥0
42 CustomerCurrency:EUR {0,1}
- ...
52 CustomerCurrency:USD {0,1}
53 PaymentType:A {0,1}
54 PaymentType:B {0,1}
55 PaymentType:C {0,1}
56 PaymentType:D {0,1}
57 NumCardsUsed Z≥0
58 PaymentAttempts Z≥0
59 isValidUserPhone {0,1}
60 bCountryCode=sCountryCode {0,1}
61 bCountryCode=CardCountry {0,1}
62 sCountryCode=CardCountry {0,1}
63 bRegion=sRegion {0,1}
64 TimeSinceFirstOrder R≥0
65 3gramDistance(UserName/CardName) [0,1]
66 3gramDistance(bCity/sCity) [0,1]
67 3gramDistance(bZip/sZip) [0,1]
68 sCountryCode RiskLevel {1,..,4}
69 sCity RiskLevel {1,..,4}
70 BinaryShippingExpress {0,1}
71 NumLast10DaysSameUser Z≥0
Appendix B
Comparing Random Forests
performance with balanced and
imbalanced training sets.
While doing the grid search for the best parameters of the Random Forests al-
gorithm, we have trained all parameter combinations on both a balanced and an
imbalanced data set. The imbalanced data set was the original data set, the nine
folds of the training set used in each run of the 10-fold cross-validation. The bal-
anced data set was a sample of the same nine folds obtained by undersampling the
data. The data was undersampled in such a way that all fraudulent orders, n, were
sampled and only the same number n of legitimate orders were sampled. Due to
this sampling approach, the balanced data set was much smaller than the imbal-
anced set. A balanced set has the advantage of not being dominated by legitimate
transactions, but the disadvantage of having only a fraction of the data points.
We calculated the difference between the performance measures AUC-PR and
AUC-ROC obtained by the same set of parameters in the case of training with
a balanced vs. imbalanced set. In case one of the sets would perform better on
average, we would expect that this difference be different from zero. Hence, we
made a hypothesis test with a t-test under the assumption that the distributions of
differences are Gaussian. The hypotheses are shown on equation B.1.
H0 : µ1 = 0 H0 : µ2 = 0 (B.1)
H1 : µ1 6= 0 H1 : µ2 6= 0
where:
µ1 = average difference AUC-ROC
µ2 = average difference AUC-PR
We obtained a p-value of 0.61 for the test on the average difference of the
AUC-ROC and of 0.48 on the average difference of the AUC-PR. On a confidence
level of 95%, we cannot reject any of the null hypotheses. This means that there is
no evidence that there is a difference in the performance when using a balanced set
obtained by undersampling.
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Appendix C
Results of testing with
additional features
Some of the variables which were studied in the exploratory analysis had to be left
out of training, because they could not be calculated in real-time due to practical
restrictions at the company as described in 5.1.1. These variables showed promising
potential to be indicative of fraud. Therefore, we chose to make a simulation of
the results which could be obtained by training and testing the Random Forests
algorithm on a data set from which the variables Device, Browser and ClickedPhotos
have not been removed. The aim is to show that the inclusion of these variables
improves the model performance, so that the company invests in the infrastructure
to make these variables available in real-time.
We see on table C.1 that there is a significant increase in the area under the
precision-recall curve (AUC-PR) from the 0.333 obtained before. The increase in
the area under the ROC curve is smaller, only up from 0.880. We would need to
repeat the testing with multiple testing sets to be sure of the significance of the
higher performance. However, these results seem to indicate that there is a reason
to improve the infrastructure to be able to include such variables.
Table C.1: Testing results with additional features.
Classifier AUC-PR AUC-ROC
Random Forests 0,404 0,895
